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Summary
The aim of this study was to investigate whether and
how alexithymia may inﬂuence decision making under
conditions of uncertainty, assessed using the Iowa
Gambling Task, in patients with newly diagnosed, un-
treated (de novo) Parkinson’s disease, as previously re-
ported for healthy subjects. 
Twenty-four patients with de novo Parkinson’s disease
underwent a neuropsychological and neuropsychiatric
assessment, including the Toronto Alexithymia Scale,
the Geriatric Depression Scale Short Form, and the
Iowa Gambling Task (IGT). 
The assessment showed that 12 patients were alex-
ithymic and 12 were non-alexithymic; seven patients
were found to be mildly depressed and 17 non-de-
pressed. Alexithymic and non-alexithymic patients did
not differ in the IGT total score; however, signiﬁcant dif-
ferences emerged across the third block of the IGT, in
which the alexithymic patients outperformed the non-
alexithymic patients. Depression did not inﬂuence IGT
performance.  
Alexithymia may modulate decision making, as as-
sessed with the IGT; alexithymia could be associated
with faster learning to avoid risky choices and negative
feedback, as previously reported in some studies con-
ducted in anxious or depressed patients.
KEY WORDS: alexithymia, anxiety, decision making, de novo Parkin-
son’s disease, depression, Iowa Gambling Task
Introduction
In recent years several studies have investigated how
neuropsychiatric features may inﬂuence decision mak-
ing under conditions of uncertainty, as assessed using
the Iowa Gambling Task (IGT) (1). High levels of impul-
sivity are associated with a poorer ability to alter choice
behavior in response to changing reward contingencies
(2-4). 
With regard to depression, some studies reported poor-
er performances in depressed patients compared with
healthy subjects (5,6), while another study reported bet-
ter performances in depressed patients, suggesting that
depression may be associated with faster learning to
avoid risky choices (7); ﬁnally, one study reported that
the IGT performances of remitted depressed patients
were similar to those of healthy subjects, suggesting
that alterations of decision-making behavior may be
state-dependent (8). As regards anxiety, some studies
reported an association between high trait anxiety and
poor decision making (9,10), while others reported op-
posite ﬁndings (11,12). Summarizing, although no clear
pattern emerges from these studies, they nevertheless
show that affective features, at least, inﬂuence decision
making, as assessed using the IGT. 
Among affective disorders, depression and anxiety are
strongly associated with alexithymia (13-16), a phenom-
enon related to an alteration in affect regulation (17): its
characteristics include inability to identify and describe
feelings, difﬁculty distinguishing feelings from bodily
sensations of emotional arousal, impaired symboliza-
tion, and an externally oriented cognitive style. Only one
study investigated the potential inﬂuence of alexithymia
on decision making (18): Ferguson and colleagues re-
ported that, on the IGT, alexithymic subjects exhibited a
response pattern characterized by standard exploration
and learning over the ﬁrst blocks of the trial, followed by
a shift to a relatively higher proportion of disadvanta-
geous choices over subsequent blocks, and ﬁnally a re-
turn to the advantageous choices in the last blocks. This
pattern was not observed in the low alexithymia partici-
pants, who showed the standard learning curve for the
IGT. This effect was especially evident when subjects
were under conditions of reduced cognitive information,
that is, in the absence of cumulative feedback. To sum-
marize, higher levels of alexithymia were found to be as-
sociated with a slowed learning rate on the IGT, and with
increased risk taking toward the end of the task; this was
consistent with the ﬁnding of an attenuation of emotion-
al learning in tasks requiring the use of previous emo-
tional information to guide future performance (19). 
To conﬁrm the potential inﬂuence of alexithymia on de-
cision making, we used ﬁndings derived from our previ-
ous studies that assessed i) the relationship between
alexithymia and depression (20) and ii) decision making
under conditions of uncertainty (21) in patients with new-
ly diagnosed untreated (de novo) Parkinson’s disease
(PD). The reason we decided to assess alexithymia in
this speciﬁc clinical population is that alexithymia is
strictly related to depression and anxiety (13-16) and
these affective disorders may precede the clinical motor
onset of PD (22,23); our decision to assess decision
making was prompted by the consideration that med-
icated patients may present decision making difﬁculties
from the early stages of PD (24-26). In these studies
(20,21) we showed that untreated patients in the early
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stages of PD, at the onset of clinical motor symptoms,
present similar levels of alexithymia and depression and
preserved decision making, compared with healthy con-
trols. These ﬁndings are consistent with those of studies
showing that both alexithymia and decision making un-
der conditions of uncertainty are related to the orbital
portions of the prefrontal cortex (27-30), a cortical area
that is not affected by the neuropathology of PD in the
early clinical stages (31). 
On the basis of our previous studies, we hypothesized
that, as observed in healthy subjects, alexithymia may
modulate decision making in patients with de novo PD;
in particular we predicted that alexithymic patients may
display a different pattern of choices, during the IGT,
compared with non-alexithymic patients, but that these
differences would not necessarily correspond to a differ-
ent IGT total score between the groups. Moreover, we
expected that the relationship between alexithymia and
decision making, if found, would probably not be inﬂu-
enced by the concomitant PD neuropathology, which, in
the early clinical stages, does not involve cerebral areas
related to alexithymia and decision making under uncer-
tainty. 
Materials and methods 
Twenty-four de novo PD patients were enrolled from two
Italian tertiary movement disorders clinics (Versilia Hos-
pital, Viareggio; Neurological Clinic, University of Pisa)
in the period from January to December 2008. All pa-
tients fulﬁlled research diagnostic criteria for idiopathic
PD (32) and gave their informed consent to participate
in the study. Patients who had clinical features sugges-
tive of primary atypical parkinsonism, such as multiple
system atrophy, progressive supranuclear palsy and
corticobasal degeneration, and those with a diagnosis of
dementia according to DSM-IV criteria (33), were not in-
cluded in the study. Magnetic resonance imaging
showed no signs of atypical parkinsonism, normal pres-
sure hydrocephalus, moderate-to-severe vascular ab-
normalities, or tumors. In all the PD patients, gender,
age and years of education were recorded.
The patients performed a computerized standard ver-
sion of the IGT, and completed the twenty-item Toronto
Alexithymia Scale (TAS-20) (34), the Geriatric Depres-
sion Scale Short Form (GDS-15) (35), and the Mini-
Mental State Examination (MMSE) (36). 
The Frontal Assessment Battery (FAB) (37) was also ad-
ministered to assess the presence of an executive dys-
function. In addition, we also interviewed patients to de-
tect positive family histories of PD or of affective disor-
ders. 
The IGT (1) requires subjects to repeatedly select cards
(100 in total) from four decks of cards, which are identi-
cal in appearance; they start with a 2000$ loan of play
money and are instructed to maximize their proﬁt. The
aim of the game is to win as much money as possible,
or, as far as possible, to avoid losing money; to achieve
this, subjects must discover which are the most advan-
tageous decks and prevalently pick up cards from those
decks. Each time they turn over a card, they win some
money; sometimes, however, on turning over a card
they also have to pay a penalty, according to a pre-pro-
grammed schedule of reward and punishment. Gains
and losses are different for each card selected from the
four decks. However, decks A and B are “disadvanta-
geous” because whilst they pay 100$ (and are therefore
high-paying decks), the penalties are also higher, so
they cost more in the long run; decks C and D, on the
other hand, are “advantageous” because whilst they pay
only 50$ (and are therefore low-paying decks), the
penalties are also lower, resulting in an overall gain in
the long run. In summary, decks A and B are equivalent
in terms of overall net loss over the trials, as are decks
C and D; the difference is that in decks A and C, punish-
ments are more frequent, but of a smaller magnitude,
while in decks B and D punishments are less frequent
but of a greater magnitude. Thus, successful task per-
formance relies on sampling more from decks C and D
than from decks A and B; indeed, there is no advantage
to be gained, for participants, by selecting more cards
from the frequent punishment (A and C) as opposed to
the infrequent punishment (B and D) decks, and vice
versa. The quantitative parameters in the IGT are the
net number of advantageous choices (selections from
decks C and D minus selections from decks A and B)
computed both for the whole 100 cards (total score) and
for ﬁve successive blocks of 20 cards each (1-20, 21-40
and so on); this latter parameter is used in order to
quantify the progressive change in selection pattern
across the IGT. Therefore, successful performances are
indicated by a positive score (>0; higher scores mean
better performances) while lower scores indicate more
risky choices (1).
The TAS-20 (34) is an extensively validated self-report
questionnaire, comprised of three subscales that inves-
tigate the following factors: F1, Difﬁculty identifying feel-
ings; F2, Difﬁculty describing feelings; F3, Difﬁculty fo-
cusing on inner affective experience. The total score on
the questionnaire allows subjects to be categorized as
non-alexithymic (scores ranging from 20 to 51), border-
line alexithymic (scores ranging from 52 to 60), or alex-
ithymic (scores ≥61). In order to compare our ﬁndings
with those of Ferguson and colleagues (18), we adopt-
ed their cut-off point, classifying patients as low alex-
ithymic (TAS-20 score ≤51) or high alexithymic (TAS-20
score >51). The GDS-15 is a validated self-report ques-
tionnaire for the evaluation of depressive symptoms; we
adopted a cut-off point of 5 (presence of depression if
the score is >5), as previously suggested for PD pa-
tients (38). 
A chi-square test was used to compare the qualitative
characteristics of patient subgroups (alexithymic vs non-
alexithymic patients; depressed vs non-depressed); for
the comparison of the quantitative variables, the Wilcox-
on-Mann-Whitney test for independent data was used.
The relation between quantitative variables was evaluat-
ed by means of a linear correlation, with a Bonferroni
correction for multiple comparisons. 
Results 
All patients were cognitively preserved (mean adjusted
MMSE score 28.60±2.14; mean adjusted FAB score
16.46±1.70). The demographic and clinical characteris-
tics of the patients are reported in Table 1. As regards
IGT performance, 10 patients obtained a negative score
(≤0) and 14 a positive (>0) score. Applying the TAS-20
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cut-off point of 51, 12 patients were found to be alex-
ithymic and 12 non-alexithymic. Applying the GDS-15
cut-off point of ﬁve, 17 patients were categorized as
non-depressed and seven as mildly depressed. Three
patients had a positive family history of PD and four pa-
tients had a positive history of affective disorders (2 ma-
jor depression, 1 dysthymia and 1 generalized anxiety
disorder). No demographic (age, gender, education) or
cognitive (MMSE, FAB) differences emerged between
the alexithymic and the non-alexithymic patients or be-
tween the depressed and the non-depressed patients.
De novo PD patients gave the following IGT scores:
(block 1-20: -1.83±3.27; block 21-40: -1.42±3.25; block
41-60: 0.42±4.60; block 61-80: 3.75±6.78; block 81-100:
3.58±7.29; total score: 4.50±16.15); in the previous
study (21) in which we compared IGT performances of
de novo PD patients and healthy controls, although the
healthy controls outperformed the de novo PD patients,
the difference did not reach statistical signiﬁcance.
In the present study, the alexithymic patients outper-
formed the non-alexithymic patients in the third IGT
block (41-60) (p=0.04); in the other IGT blocks and in
the IGT total score no differences emerged between the
alexithymic and the non-alexithymic patients (Fig. 1). No
differences emerged (p=0.45) between the IGT perform-
ances of depressed and non-depressed patients, either
in the total score (2.44±12.40 and 2.63±17.37 respec-
tively) or in the ﬁve blocks of 20 choices. 
In the whole patient sample, correlation analyses re-
vealed that the MMSE and FAB were negatively corre-
lated with age (respectively r=-.443; p=0.03 and r=-.565;
p=0.004); the TAS-20 and the GDS-15 were signiﬁcant-
ly correlated (r=.451; p=0.027). Considering the TAS-20
subscales, the GDS-15 signiﬁcantly correlated with the
F1 subscale (Difﬁculty identifying feelings) (r=.561;
p=0.012) and the F2 subscale (Difﬁculty describing feel-
ings) (r=.929; p<.001). The TAS-20 was correlated neg-
atively with education (r=-.520; p=<0.001). The TAS-20
total score and the TAS-20 subscales F2 and F3 did not
correlate with any IGT parameter, while the TAS-20 F1
subscale correlated positively with the IGT 21-40 score
(r=.0559; p=0.013) and negatively with the IGT 61-80
(r=-.488; p=0.034) and the IGT 81-100 (r=-.666; p=0.02)
scores.
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Table 1 - Characteristics of de novo Parkinson’s disease patients
PD patients Non-alexithymic Alexithymic p value
(total sample) PD patients PD patients
n = 24 n = 12 n = 12
Mean (SD) Mean (SD) Mean (SD)
Age 65.04 (6.23) 66.17 (5.20) 63.92 (7.17) 0.47
Gender m/f 17/7 7/5 10/2 /
Education 8.92 (4.03) 10.58 (4.37) 7.25 (2.95) 0.60
MMSE 28.60 (2.14) 28.72 (2.41) 28.49 (1.94) 0.71
FAB 16.46 (1.70) 16.27 (1.89) 16.64 (1.55) 0.79
GDS-15 4.83 (3.49) 3.33 (2.34) 6.33 (3.89) 0.14
TAS-20 51.46 (13.47) 40.67 (8.35) 62.25 (7.44) < 0.01*
TAS-20 F1 17.11 (5.71) 12.86 (4.18) 19.58 (5.07) 0.013*
TAS-20 F2 15.21 (5.32) 10.00 (3.91) 18.25 (3.27) < 0.01*
TAS-20 F3 21.16 (5.39) 15.86 (4.70) 24.25 (2.70) < 0.01*
IGT Total score 4.50 (16.15) 2.33 (18.04) 6.67 (14.48) 0.29
IGT 1-20 -1.83 (3.27) -2.00 (3.19) -1.67 (3.49) 0.75
IGT 21-40 -1.42 (3.25) -1.67 (3.17) -1.17 (3.46) 0.75
IGT 41-60 0.42 (4.60) -1.17 (3.99) 2.00 (5.90) 0.04*
IGT 61-80 3.75 (6.78) 3.00 (7.97) 4.50 (5.60) 0.17
IGT 81-100 3.58 (7.29) 4.17 (8.37) 3.00 (6.35) 0.97
Abbreviations and symbols: *=statistically different; FAB=Frontal Assessment Battery; GDS-15: Geriatric Depression Scale Short
Form; IGT=Iowa Gambling Task; MMSE=Mini-Mental State Examination; SD=standard deviation; TAS-20= twenty-item Toronto Alex-
ithymia Scale; TAS-20 F1=Difﬁculty identifying feelings; TAS-20 F2=Difﬁculty describing feelings; TAS-20 F3=Difﬁculty focusing on in-
ner affective experience.
Figure 1. IGT performances of alexithymic and non-alexithymic
de novo PD patients.
Alexithymic de novo PD
patients (n=12)
Non-alexithymic de novo PD
patients (n=12)
Discussion
On the basis of previous empirical ﬁndings we hypothe-
sized that alexithymia may inﬂuence decision making
under conditions of uncertainty. To test this hypothesis
we adopted ﬁndings from our previous studies investi-
gating i) the relationship between alexithymia and de-
pression (20) and ii) decision making under uncertainty
(21) in patients with newly diagnosed untreated PD. In
these studies we found similar levels of alexithymia and
preserved decision making in PD patients in comparison
with healthy controls, probably because alexithymia and
decision making under uncertainty are both related to
the orbital portions of the prefrontal cortex (27-30), a
cortical area that is not affected by the PD neuropathol-
ogy in the early clinical stages (31). These ﬁndings sug-
gested that the relationship between alexithymia and
decision making, if found, would probably not be inﬂu-
enced by the concomitant PD neuropathology, which in
the early clinical stages does not involve cerebral areas
related to alexithymia and decision making under uncer-
tainty. On the basis of reports of modulating effects of af-
fective features on decision making under uncertainty
(5-12), we predicted that alexithymia would have a mod-
ulating effect on decision making under uncertainty also
in de novo PD patients. 
Three empirical ﬁndings emerged from the present
study. First, the alexithymic and non-alexithymic pa-
tients performed similarly on the IGT; in fact, although
the alexithymic patients outperformed the non-alex-
ithymic patients, the difference did not reach statistical
signiﬁcance. This ﬁnding is in line with the ﬁndings of
Ferguson and colleagues (18), who reported similar IGT
total scores in alexithymic and non-alexithymic healthy
young subjects. 
Second, it emerged that alexithymia may modulate
learning across the IGT. The alexithymic patients signiﬁ-
cantly outperformed non-alexithymic patients in the cen-
tral phase of the IGT (block 41-60), suggesting that alex-
ithymia could be associated with faster learning to avoid
risky choices and the negative feedback with which
these choices are more frequently associated. This pat-
tern of choices is similar to patterns described in some
studies in depressed patients (7) and anxious patients
(11), which showed that depression and anxiety are as-
sociated with faster learning to avoid risky choices. The
modulating effect of some alexithymic features on deci-
sion making is also suggested by the different direction
of the correlations between the TAS-20 F1 subscale (Dif-
ﬁculty identifying feelings) and IGT partial scores: posi-
tive in the second block (choices 21-40) and negative in
the last two blocks (choices 61-100). In the early phases
of the IGT the reward-punishment schedule of the task is
opaque and learning is taking place at a non-declarative,
implicit level (39); in these phases, in which subjects do
not have a clear understanding of what is going on – this
is the pre-hunch phase of the task (39) –, difﬁculty iden-
tifying feelings related to the reward-punishment sched-
ule may induce them to adopt a conservative strategy,
which enhances the IGT performance. However, while
this strategy of choice enhances performances in the
early IGT phases, it impairs them in the ﬁnal IGT phas-
es, as suggested by the negative correlations in the last
two IGT blocks, and as also previously reported; as a
matter of fact Ferguson and colleagues (18) reported
that alexithymic subjects were characterized by a rela-
tively higher proportion of choices from disadvantageous
decks in the last IGT phases (choices 71-90). Our ﬁnd-
ing conﬁrms that alexithymic subjects may present atten-
uated emotional learning along the task; this attenuated
emotional learning is probably due to problems consoli-
dating previous emotional experience (19) and probably
hampers the hunch phase (hypotheses generated on
which were the “good” and “bad” decks) and the concep-
tual phase (clear idea of what is going on) in the IGT per-
formance. Considering that i) a substantial minority of
healthy subjects does not reach the conceptual phase
despite performing normally on the task (18), and ii) a
minority of healthy subjects fails the task, obtaining a
negative total score (40-42), it would be interesting to
verify in further studies whether these subgroups have
higher levels of alexithymia, which may interfere with
their emotional learning. 
Third, contrary to what has been reported in samples of
patients with major depression (5,6), in our study de-
pression did not inﬂuence the IGT performance. Howev-
er, the patients in our sample did not show major de-
pression, with the exception of one who had a score of
14 on the GDS-15. The presence of patients with only
mild depressive symptoms may probably explain why
our study found a different relationship between depres-
sion and decision making compared to studies on pa-
tients with major depression. 
In conclusion, this study conﬁrmed that alexithymia may
modulate decision making under uncertainty, as as-
sessed by the IGT, suggesting that alexithymic features
in patients should be taken into account when assessing
decision making. 
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